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CAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS REALLY PERMIT RELIGIOUS SPEECH
WITHOUT PROMOTING RELIGION? THE STRUGGLE TO
ACCOMMODATE BUT NOT ESTABLISH RELIGION IN
CHANDLER v. JAMES
"Whether neutrality [towards religion] will be benevolent and lean
toward the accommodation of free exercise or be hostile and lean toward
nonestablishment will depend on the reasoning of future judges faced
with new sets of facts. ,,
I. INTRODUCTION
The tension between the First Amendment's religion clauses, the Es-
tablishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, is most clearly high-
lighted by the many cases in federal courts involving religious speech in
public schools.2 The Establishment Clause provides that Congress shall
not make laws that have the effect of establishing religion.3 The Framers
recognized great value in preventing the entanglement of government
and the religions of its people, thus they erected a wall between Church
and State with this clause. 4 The First Amendment to the Constitution also
1. Richard S. Vacca et al., Accommodation of Religion Without Establishment of Reli-
gion, 115 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 9, 22 (1997).
2. See Daniel N. McPherson, Student-Initiated Religious Expression in the Public
Schools: The Need for a Wider Opening in the Schoolhouse Gate, 30 CREIGHTON L. REV.
393, 393 (1997) (recognizing that controversy and conflict between Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses is most apparent in public schools). McPherson's arti-
cle mentions that part of the reason for so much controversy is that students' right
to express religious beliefs in the public school setting is not well defined. See id. at
394 (noting law is not well-established where students' religious rights in schools
are involved); see also Charles J. Russo, Prayer at Public School Graduation Ceremonies:
An Exercise of Futility or a Teachable Moment?, 1999 BYU EDuc. & L.J. 1, 3 (Winter
1999) (stating that "[p] ublic education presents today's Court with one of its great-
est challenges as it interprets the religion clauses").
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion .... ").
4. See ADRIENNE KOCH & WILLIAM PEDEN EDS., THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRIT-
INGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 332 (1944) (recalling significance of speech Jefferson
gave at Convention 13 years after First Amendment was adopted). Thomas Jeffer-
son declared that the religion clauses in effect built "a wall of separation between
Church and State." Id. (quoting Jefferson). See Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Drawing
Lines in the Shifting Sand: Where Should the Establishment Wall Stand? Recent Develop-
ments in Establishment Clause Theory: Accommodation, State Action, the Public Forum, and
Private Religious Speech, 8 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REv. 1, 9 (1998) (noting that
Supreme Court has always looked to intent of Constitution's Framers when deter-
mining meaning of constitutional provisions (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 11-14 (1947))); Russo, supra note 2, at 1-2 (recognizing that Framers wished
to prohibit establishment of state-sponsored religion while protecting free exercise
of religion); Vacca et al., supra note 1, at 9 ("[T]he High Court has often tried to
(547)
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contains the Free Exercise Clause, which was designed to protect individu-
als' rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of religious speech. 5
Because governmental establishment of religion would hinder rather than
protect free exercise, the religion clauses of the First Amendment were
meant to work together to protect religious freedom. 6 More frequently,
however, establishment and free exercise concerns tend to conflict and
problems arise, especially when states seek to accommodate the right of
religious speech in their public school systems.
7
maintain the wall of separation between church and state with its duty to protect
the free exercise of religious expression.").
5. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion]; or abridging the freedom of speech ...."). It is impor-
tant to note that although the government absolutely may not establish religion,
the individual right to free exercise of religion is not an absolute right protecting
all religious activity. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). This
idea is easily illustrated by thinking of a religion that requires the smoking of pe-
yote, an illegal activity. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 882-90 (1990) (holding religious activity that otherwise violates valid
laws is not protected under Free Exercise Clause).
Aside from limits on free exercise, there are also limits imposed on free
speech depending on where the speech takes place. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) (noting three types of fora
where speech occurs). One type is a public forum, such as a public park, tradition-
ally open to assembly and debate, where free speech is protected. See id. The
second is a government public forum (sometimes called a limited public forum),
created specifically for the general public as a place to assemble and speak freely,
where speech may be limited to particular subjects. See id. Finally, the nonpublic
forum is a place where the First Amendment does not guarantee free speech. See
id. at 803 (noting nonpublic forum is not guaranteed same free speech rights as
public forums). The court must determine whether the forum was intended by
the government to be public and to what extent the forum could be used. See id. at
802-03. In the public forums, the government may only reasonably restrict speech
as to time, place and manner on a content-neutral basis and for a compelling gov-
ernment interest. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45-46 (1983) (noting limits on government action in public forum). The
Supreme Court has held that religious expression does not violate the Establish-
ment Clause when it is purely private and "occurs in a traditional or designated
public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms." Capital Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995).
6. See Chandler v. James, 958 F. Supp. 1550, 1555 (M.D. Ala. 1997). The
Chandler court pointed out that while the Establishment Clause prevents legisla-
tures from preferring a particular religion, the Free Exercise Clause guarantees
that legislatures will not inhibit the practice of any particular religion. See id. The
Supreme Court has stated that a law with the purpose or effect of discriminating
among religions or impeding any religion is unconstitutional. See Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (noting that
First Amendment forbids official action with purpose to disapprove any religion or
all religion). The religion clauses have been interpreted to work together to pro-
tect religious activities that are too sacred to be proscribed or prescribed by the
government. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992) (stating that religious
beliefs and worship are precious and chosen by private citizens under their consti-
tutional promise of freedom).
7. See, e.g., Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir.
1996) (addressing challenge to Mississippi statute enacted to protect religious
rights of students); Chandler, 958 F. Supp. at 1559-60 (dealing with Alabama statute
[Vol. 45: p. 547
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For years, the United States Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts have dealt with states' attempts to permit devotional expression in
public schools and at school-related events. 8 With the declared purpose of
protecting students' First Amendment rights in the school setting, schools
frequently crossed over constitutional lines to participate in, require or
endorse that which is religious.9 Although it is true that students' free
speech, including prayer, is protected when students are on government-
owned school grounds, the prayer must remain personal and private, with
no involvement by the state. 10 Once a state becomes involved or takes a
position other than a neutral one toward religion, it violates the Establish-
ment Clause. 1 1 The states' and schools' constitutionally mandated duty to
with purpose to accommodate right of religious expression of students); see also
Vacca et al., supra note 1, at 9 ("Despite its attempts to remain neutral in matters of
religion, government (federal, and state) has not been, nor can it be, completely
separated from religion."). Vacca's article states that nowhere is the difficulty to
remain neutral toward religion more evident than in establishing, maintaining and
operating public schools. See id. (relating government inability to remain neutral
with public schools). Tracing the history of this phenomenon in the federal courts
from the 1940s on, it is apparent that suits involving religion and public schools
rapidly increased, with several of the issues reaching the Supreme Court. See id.
"Since then, the Supreme Court has struggled to balance the often competing
prohibitions of the First Amendment." Id.
8. See Russo, supra note 2, at 3 n.9 (noting that in past 20 years, Supreme
Court has addressed more school cases on religion than any other topic). See gener-
ally Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (permitting clergy to give nonsectarian invocation at public
high school graduation ceremonies violates Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaf-
free, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (giving moment of silence at beginning of school day is
state action and impermissible); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (permitting daily Bible reading in public classroom not consti-
tutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (allowing daily recitation by school
members of denominationally neutral state written prayer found
unconstitutional).
9. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 577 (holding that school may not permit clergymen
to lead nonsectarian prayers at graduation ceremonies); Engel, 370 U.S. at 421, 436
(holding that requirement of recitation in schools of prayer composed by New
York State's Board of Regents violated Establishment Clause); Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at
281 (striking down statute before enacted because school involvement was inevita-
ble); Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 902 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding Louisiana stat-
ute to protect students religious rights unconstitutional because student
participation could not be completely free from governmental involvement in reli-
gious activity); Chandler, 958 F. Supp. at 1556-68 (holding that Alabama prayer
statute applied unconstitutionally when school officials organized and sponsored
religious activities).
10. See Board of Educ. of the West Side Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 250-51 (1990) (stating that genuinely student-initiated religious speech is free
speech and free exercise protected by religion clauses of First Amendment); see
also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(reminding that students maintain their constitutional rights while in school and
student religious speech does not become state speech once inside schoolhouse
doors).
11. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (noting utmost importance that government act not have effect of endorsing
or disapproving religion). The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Constitution re-
quires neutrality and that government must not endorse disbelief over religion and
3
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remain separated from religion, while permitting students' free exercise of
religious speech, is not an easy one, especially because law on the subject is
not well established.' 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ad-
dressed several cases relating to state actions attempting to accommodate
or protect religious rights, as well as school district initiated religious reso-
lutions.13 In 1977, Alabama enacted its original "school prayer statute."
14
After much scrutiny by the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court, and a
few revisions, the statute took on its most current form in 1993.15 The
Alabama school prayer statute permitted nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
student-initiated invocations, benedictions or prayer at compulsory and
noncompulsory school-related events. 16 Although the district court found
the statute facially unconstitutional and sought to enjoin the school from
permitting such speech, the Eleventh Circuit leaned toward accommoda-
tion of religion and found that the district court could not constitutionally
vice versa. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating
that neutrality requires no endorsement or censorship). It points out that while
the First Amendment requires the government to tolerate both and establish
neither, it allows citizens to choose one or the other and express their preference
wherever their free speech rights exist. See id. at 1261 n.il.
12. See McPherson, supra note 2, at 393-94 (noting that law is not well estab-
lished where students' religious rights in schools are involved); Russo, supra note 2,
at 4 (recognizing that absence of definite First Amendment interpretation leaves
religion clauses and public education at odds).
13. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1256 (dealing with Alabama school prayer statute
allowing genuinely student-initiated religious speech at all activities and to same
extent as secular speech); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1476
(11 th Cir. 1997) (challenging school policy permitting prayer at graduation cere-
mony); Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 826 (11th Cir. 1989)
(addressing issue of pre-game invocations given by clergymen at public school
football);Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing stat-
ute allowing for one minute of silence to be observed for meditation or voluntary
prayer at beginning of school day).
14. See Chandler, 958 F. Supp. at 1553 (noting that in 1977, Alabama passed
first school prayer statute allowing moment of silence at beginning of school day).
The 1977 statute, supplemented in 1981, declared that a moment of silence be
observed for meditation or voluntary prayer. See id. (citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1
(1975, 1995 Replacement Volume)). In 1982, the third statute was passed allowing
teachers in public schools to lead willing students in a particular prayer. See id.
(discussing evolution of Alabama school prayer statute). Both statutes were struck
down by the Eleventh Circuit for violating the Establishment Clause. See Jaffree,
705 F.2d at 1535-36 (holding statute authorizing school involvement in religious
activities unconstitutional), affd, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (affirming that section 16-1-
20.1 of Alabama Code violated Establishment Clause of First Amendment), affd in
part, 466 U.S. 924 (1984) (Stevens,J., concurring) (affirming that section 16-1-20.2
of Alabama Code violated Establishment Clause of First Amendment).
15. See Chandler, 958 F. Supp. at 1553 (noting enactment of fourth Alabama
statute in 1993).
16. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.3 (1995). "Sectarian" is defined as being "devoted
to, or prejudiced in favor of, some [religious body or denomination]." WEBSTER'S
NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, 1213 (3d College ed. 1988). "Proselytize" is defined as
"try[ing] to convert (a person), especially to one's religion." Id. at 1080.
[Vol. 45: p. 547
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enjoin student religious speech. 17 Other circuits have dealt with similar
student-initiated religious speech issues and reached different conclu-
sions.1 8 The inconsistent opinions among the circuits on the various stu-
dent-initiated religious speech issues may pose yet another question for
the Supreme Court to address concerning the tension between the Estab-
lishment and Free Exercise Clauses. 19
This Note discusses the evolution of federal law following state and
school initiatives to permit, and at times promote, prayer in public
schools. Part II begins by examining the constitutional issues associated
with student religious speech in public schools.20 Part III lays out the basis
for the constitutional challenge of the Alabama school prayer statute in
Chandler v. James.21 Part IV traces and analyzes the Eleventh Circuit's rea-
sons for concluding that genuinely student-initiated religious speech in
public schools is not unconstitutional, rather it is protected by the First
Amendment. 22 Part V considers the possible impact of the Chandler hold-
ing on inevitable future cases dealing with prayer in public schools.2 3
II. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Supreme Court Precedent
Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has entertained many cases in-
volving public school prayer issues. 24 Over the years, individual states and
school districts attempted, by various means, to allow a place for prayer in
their public schools.2 5 Although the topic is recurring, guidance from the
17. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1258 (holding that district court may not consti-
tutionally enjoin school from permitting student religious speech).
18. See generally Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir.
1996) (emphasizing anti-establishment and striking down statute very similar to
Alabama statute before applied because court believed school involvement was
inevitable).
19. See Russo, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that absence of definite First Amend-
ment interpretation and conflicting lower federal court opinions on prayer in pub-
lic schools will lead issue back to Supreme Court).
20. For a discussion of the constitutional issues associated with student reli-
gious speech in public schools, see infra notes 23-106 and accompanying text.
21. 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1994). For a discussion of the basis for the con-
stitutional challenge to the Alabama statute in Chandler, see infra notes 107-116
and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's reasons for concluding that gen-
uinely student-initiated religious speech in public schools is not unconstitutional,
but instead is protected by the First Amendment, see infra notes 117-97 and accom-
panying text.
23. For a discussion of the possible impact of the holding in this case on the
inevitable cases to come dealing with prayer in public schools, see infra notes 198-
207 and accompanying text.
24. See Russo, supra note 2, at 3 n.9 (noting that in past 20 years, Supreme
Court has addressed more school cases on religion than any other topic).
25. See generally Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (permitting clergy to
give nonsectarian invocation at public high school graduation ceremonies violated
Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (giving moment of
20001 NOTE
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Supreme Court concerning the tension between the religion clauses in the
First Amendment in the public school setting is less than clear for the
lower federal courts.
26
In 1962, the Court addressed the issue of a state-prescribed official
prayer in the public school system in Engel v. Vitale.27 The Court ex-
plained that the First Amendment's purpose is to guarantee freedom from
government control over religion and that it applies to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.28 Accordingly, neither federal nor state gov-
ernment may prescribe by law any particular prayer at government-spon-
sored activities. 29 A public school system is under government control,
therefore, a daily recitation of a state-composed prayer in its schools is
state action that violates the Establishment Clause.M The Court in Engel
held that such state-prescribed prayer is unconstitutional state action re-
gardless of whether or not the prayer endorsed a particular religion.
3 1
A year after Engel, the Supreme Court confronted a case involving a
challenge to Pennsylvania's requirement that there be a Bible reading at
the beginning of each public school day in School District of Abington Town-
silence at beginning of school day is state action and impermissible); School Dist.
of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (permitting daily Bible
reading in public classroom not constitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (allowing daily recitation of denominationally neutral, state, written prayer
by school members found unconstitutional).
26. See Russo, supra note 2, at 4 (suggesting that lack of definitive interpreta-
tion of First Amendment by Supreme Court leads to conflicting lower federal
court outcomes).
27. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The Engel Court held that New York's prescription
of a specific prayer to be said daily at public schools constituted impermissible state
action endorsing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 436. But
see Vacca et al., supra note 1, at II ("Engel, in the narrowest sense, treated a specific
prayer recommended by the State of New York Board of Regents; it did not deal
with other kinds of religious activities or exercises.").
28. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430 (holding that First Amendment religion clauses
operate against states by virtue of Fourteenth Amendment forbidding governmen-
tal encroachment upon religious freedom); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (finding that First Amendment's mandate that Congress shall
make no law respecting establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof has been made wholly applicable to States by Fourteenth Amendment).
29. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 220 ("We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a
State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person to 'profess a
belief or disbelief in any religion.'" (quoting Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495
(1961))); Engel, 370 U.S. at 430 (holding that neither state nor federal government
has power to prescribe prayer or sponsor religious activity). The Court also set
forth that states cannot constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements that ben-
efit all religions but not the nonreligious, or benefit those who believe in God but
not the atheistic. See id. (citing Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 495-96 (holding that require-
ment of declaration of belief in God, as test for political office, violated freedom of
religion via First and Fourteenth Amendments of United States Constitution)).
30. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 425 (noting control of state over its public school
system to prescribe prayer is unconstitutional).
31. See id. at 430 (stating that denominational neutrality of any state prayer
still establishes religion and is not free from Establishment Clause restrictions).
[Vol. 45: p. 547
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ship v. Schempp.32 Again, the Court had to decide if a particular state ac-
tion prescribing religious speech in public schools violated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. 33 As in Engel, the school children
were not compelled to listen or participate and could be excused during
the prayer with a note from their parents. 3 4 Also, the teachers made no
comments or interpretations, just a simple reading was done then the ex-
ercise ended.35 Regardless of such limitations, the fact that this practice
was conducted by school officials in every school in the Commonwealth
was enough to render it a violation of the Establishment Clause.36 The
Court reiterated that the Commonwealth did not have the authority to
introduce religious ceremonies into its public schools.37 The Court recog-
nized that establishment of religion tends to hinder rather than protect
free exercise of religion, a right that is of paramount importance in a
country where people from around the world, with diverse backgrounds,
have come to enjoy the freedoms upon which the United States was
founded. 38 Supporting the majority, the concurrence also emphasized
32. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
33. See id. at 205 (addressing Pennsylvania law requiring public school day to
begin with reading of 10 verses of Christian Bible). The readings could take place
by a volunteer student over the school's broadcast system, or in the absence of
such a system, the readings would be done in the homeroom by the teacher or
volunteer students. See id. at 207 (laying out procedures for prayer in schools).
34. See id. at 205 (recognizing statute provided that "[alny child shall be ex-
cused from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written
request of his parent or guardian" (citing 24 PA. STAT. § 15-1516, as amended,
Pub. L. 1928 (Supp. 1960)). The factual record showed that students, as well as
their parents, were informed that the religious exercises were voluntary, and that
the student could excuse him or herself from the classroom, or remain and not
participate. See id. at 207 (noting voluntariness of participation).
35. See id. (noting that as applied, there are "no prefatory statements, no ques-
tions asked or solicited, no comments or explanations made and no interpreta-
tions given at or during the exercises" of Bible readings).
36. See id. at 224-25 (holding that fact that participation of all students was
voluntary, and that they could be excused from attendance at religious exercise,
did not alleviate clear Establishment Clause violation inherent in state-sponsored
religious activity). The exercises were clearly state action because they were held
in the school buildings, could be conducted by teachers and were under the au-
thority of the local school authorities. See id. at 210-11. Furthermore, the statute
required the reading of the Christian Bible, clearly preferring a particular religion,
which goes against the Establishment Clause. See id. at 211.
37. See id. at 223 (agreeing with trial court that Bible readings are religious
ceremonies intended by State in violation of Establishment Clause); see also Vacca
et al., supra note 1, at 10 (noting that Supreme Court has not forbidden religion in
public schools, but prohibits state-required religious ceremonies, which represent
breach of constitutional neutrality).
38. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 214 (noting that "freedom to worship was indis-
pensable in a country whose people came from the four quarters of the earth and
brought with them a diversity of religious opinion").
7
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that although the state was not authorized to prefer one religion over an-
other, it was also not authorized to be hostile toward any religion.3 9
Later, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 0 the Court addressed the question of
the constitutionality of state statutes providing state aid to church-related
schools. 4 1 In Lemon, the Supreme Court set forth a test to check whether
state action was in violation of the Establishment Clause.42 To satisfy the
Clause, governmental action must have a clearly secular purpose, must not
have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion and must avoid
excessive entanglement between church and state.4 3 The "Lemon Test," as
it came to be called, has since been used repeatedly in school prayer
cases.
4 4
Although the Supreme Court has set forth many opinions in the last
few decades on cases examining state involvement with religious speech in
public schools, the most relevant, and most recent, comes from Lee v. Weis-
man.45 Lee involved a challenge to inclusion of invocations and benedic-
tions at high school graduation ceremonies. 4 6 Although the district court
that originally heard the Lee case used the Supreme Court's Lemon Test to
establish unconstitutionality, on review, the Court chose to invalidate the
religious practice on grounds of coercive effect instead.4 7
39. See id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (cautioning that although govern-
ment must remain neutral toward religion, it must not be too devoted to secular-
ism or hostile toward religion).
40. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
41. See id. at 625 (holding that state provision of funds to church-related
schools violated Establishment Clause).
42. See id. at 612-13 (determining that whenever Establishment Clause issue is
raised "[e]very analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumula-
tive criteria developed by the Court over many years"). The Court found three
tests arising out of past Court cases. See id. (examining past Supreme Court opin-
ions dealing with Establishment Clause). The Court identifies three questions it
must ask: first, does the statute have a secular legislative purpose; second, is its
primary effect one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and third, does the
statute prevent an excessive government entanglement with religion. See id.; see
also Vacca et al., supra note 1, at 14 ("Lemon v. Kurtzman narrowed the scope of
religious accommodation in its crafting of criteria to apply to future Establishment
Clause issues.").
43. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
772-73 (1973) (clarifying Establishment Clause test set forth in Lemon).
44. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583 n.4 (1987) (noting that Lemon
test has been used in all cases involving Establishment Clause challenges to state
action except one since its adoption in 1971).
45. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
46. See id. at 580 (addressing permission of nonsectarian invocations and
benedictions given by clergyman at public school graduation ceremonies).
47. See id. at 593-94 (establishing another test under Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence focusing on whether state activity had coercive effect on students).
The test materialized as the Court examined three factors: (1) the amount of gov-
ernment control or direction over the school activity; (2) whether the prayer is a
formal religious observance; and (3) the amount and source of psychological pres-
sure on the students to participate. See id. at 586-93.
8
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The central issue in Lee was whether the school could instruct a clergy-
man to lead nonsectarian prayer during a school activity without violating
either of the religion clauses of the First Amendment. 48 The school ar-
gued that student attendance was voluntary and those who did not want to
take part could simply not attend the ceremony.4 9 This argument held
little merit as the Constitution surely would not provide for individuals to
forfeit the privilege of their own graduation ceremony as the only alterna-
tive to state-sponsored religious activity.50 The Court found that the
school practice was state action, and it held that the government cannot
command or participate in religious activities.
5
'
B. Approaches Among the Circuit Courts
The circuits have addressed a range of school- related religious
speech issues over the years invoking examination under the Establish-
ment Clause and have leaned either more toward accommodation of reli-
48. See id. at 580 (questioning whether including clergy who offer prayer at
official school ceremony violated First Amendment).
49. See id. at 594-95 (noting stipulation that attendance was voluntary).
50. See id. at 596 ("The Constitution forbids the State to exact religious con-
formity from a student as the price of attending her own high school gradua-
tion."). The Court recognized that throughout the educational process there may
be times when religious practices or persons may be involved with public schools
and students, only raising issues of accommodation, not establishment of religion.
See id. at 598-99 (citing Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 231-33 (1990) (holding that school permitting student-initiated, student-led
religious club after school did not convey message of state approval or endorse-
ment of religion)). The Court felt, however, that prayer exercises commanded by
the state had the effect of public pressure, as well as peer pressure, and left a
dissenting student with no choice but to either conform or miss an event that
holds particular importance for them. See id. at 593, 596 (holding that school's
religious exercise leaves dissenting students no alternatives to conformance or for-
feit of benefit of graduation ceremony); see also Vacca et al., supra note 1, at 18
(discussing Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lee). Vacca's article notes that Justice
Kennedy believed that the amount of involvement by school officials "made it clear
that graduation prayer bore the imprint of the State and put school-aged children
who object in an untenable position," subject not only to state coercion, but also
"the natural pressure from their peers to participate in school activities like gradu-
ation." Id. Justice Scalia, however, opined in his dissent that the application of the
majority's psychological coercion standard would make it possible to declare any
good faith effort to accommodate students' religious rights in public school a viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. See id. at 19 (discussing Scalia's dissent in Lee).
51. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 587-88 (stating that school official deciding which invo-
cation should be given is equivalent to decree by State statute, and government has
no business commanding religious activity); see also School Dist. of Abington Town-
ship v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 210-11 (1963) (noting students' voluntary partici-
pation and possibility of excused nonattendance at religious exercise did not
alleviate clear Establishment Clause violation inherent in state-sponsored religious
activity); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 421 (1962) (holding that New York's pre-
scription of specific daily prayer at public schools constituted religious activity and
using school system to endorse prayer violated Establishment Clause).
20001 NOTE
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gion or toward anti-establishment.52 Conflicting results may be attributed
to the fact that the Supreme Court decisions on these types of issues are
always fact-specific and case-by-case holdings, leaving few general blanket
rules and much open for debate.5 3 This lack of guidance has made it hard
for the courts, as well as school officials, to discern precisely when a state
action crosses over the line from accommodation of religious freedom to
establishment of religion.5
4
1. Fifth Circuit Precedent
Over the last decade, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has been guided by Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence in school prayer cases. 55 In 1991, the court decided that a school
district resolution permitting a student volunteer to offer a nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing religious speech at graduation ceremonies did not vio-
late the Establishment Clause in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School Dis-
trict ('Jones f').56 Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the case to be reconsidered in light of Lee, a case issued shortly afterJones I
in which the Court decided that a school graduation prayer policy violated
the First Amendment. 57
On remand, in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District ('Jones
If,), 58 the Fifth Circuit applied all three tests emerging from Supreme
Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence when reviewing the case.5 9
52. For a discussion of the circuit courts' holdings and treatments of the vari-
ous types of cases, see infra notes 52-106 and accompanying text.
53. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 597 (noting that Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is fact-sensitive, requiring delicate examination and distinc-
tion between cases).
54. See Jay Alan Sekulow et al., Proposed Guidelines for Student Religious Speech
and Observance in Public Schools, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1017, 1018-19 (1995) (recogniz-
ing unanswered question of how to accommodate religious speech in public
schools and need for guidance on how and when to restrict students' religious
expression).
55. See generally Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806 (5th Cir.
1999); Ingebretsen v.Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996);Jones v.
Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Jones I];
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter
Jones 1].
56. 930 F.2d 416, 417 (holding school resolution does not violate Establish-
ment Clause), vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992).
57. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 505 U.S. 1215, 1215 (1992)
(vacating and remandingJones Ifor reconsideration in light of Lee). As mentioned
in Lee, the Supreme Court decided that the school's decision to invite clergy to
graduation to deliver a nonsectarian invocation represented state coercion to par-
take in religious acts, clearly in violation of the Establishment Clause. See Lee, 505
U.S. at 598-99 (holding that religious exercises may not be conducted by school at
graduation ceremony where students are induced to conform).
58. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1995).
59. See id. at 966-70 (analyzing issue under all five tests set forth and used by
Supreme Court when determining whether school or state activity constitutes es-
tablishment of religion). The court mentioned five tests while actually using the
556 [Vol. 45: p. 547
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The resolution survived the Lemon test and endorsement test scrutiny. 611
Next, the court turned to examination under Lee, applying a test that eval-
uated psychological coercive effect on students from the state or school
involvement in public school prayer.61
The first element of unconstitutional coercion under the Lee test is
direction by the state. 62 The resolution contains no school direction as to
the type and speaker of the invocation, as opposed to Lee, where the
school directed a clergyman to say a prayer.63 Instead, under the school
graduation prayer policy in Jones II, a student speaks and the invocation is
up to the students, the only requirement being that it is nonsectarian and
nonproselytizing. 64 The next prong of the test, religiosity, was present in
Lee where the clergyman was directed to say a prayer; in Jones II, the resolu-
tion does not require prayer over any other type of student invocation. 6
5
Lastly, the test prohibits the state from putting any psychological pressure
on students to participate in religious activities. 66 In Jones II, the decisions
three established Supreme Court tests, because in its analysis, the court used the
three prongs of the Lemon test as separate tests, and then also applied the coercion
test and the endorsement test. See id.
60. See id. at 966-68 (holding that resolution was constitutional under all three
prongs of Lemon test and after endorsement analysis). The court found that the
resolution had the secular purpose of solemnizing graduation, had the primary
effect of impressing upon students the importance of the occasion and freed the
school of any entanglement with religion by leaving the religious speech com-
pletely in the hands of the students. See id. at 966-69. The endorsement test is
discussed in Justice O'Connor's concurrences in 1985 and 1989 cases before the
Court. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623-32 (1989) (discussing
endorsement test); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that endorsement test defines purpose of Establishment
Clause by testing whether government has made religious beliefs relevant to per-
son's standing in political community by conveying message of preference of par-
ticular religion or religious belief). The test is whether a reasonable person would
view the government action as disapproval for her religious preference. See County
of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630-31. The Fifth Circuit decided that a reasonable gradu-
ating senior who participated in the decision "as to whether her graduation will
include an invocation by a fellow student volunteer" would understand that the
speech was private, and not the choice of the state. Jones II, 977 U.S. at 969 (hold-
ing that graduating senior, as reasonable mature person, would understand pri-
vate, solemnizing nature of religious speech).
61. See id. at 969-70 (discussing psychological coercive effect test set forth by
Court in Lee).
62. See id. at 970-71 (stating that direct government control over religious ac-
tivity in school is determinative in finding violation of Establishment Clause).
63. See id. (noting that Resolution dictates that students, not school, shall de-
cide whether or not to have invocation at graduation, and precludes all but stu-
dent from giving invocation).
64. See id. at 971 (noting that school does not solicit invocations in particular,
but clearly forbids schools from allowing sectarian or proselytizing invocations).
65. See id. (noting that resolution tolerates prayer, but does not require or
favor it).
66. See id. (discussing little psychological pressure on students pursuant to res-
olution after each student participates in decision as to whether prayers will be
given). The court finds little pressure because the students would be aware that
11
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are made by the students, high school seniors, absent any pressure from
the school on whether to have the invocation or not.67 Thus, the court
decided that the coercive effect articulated in Lee did not exist in the
school district's resolution.
68
The Fifth Circuit revisited Jones IIby analyzing a challenge to a school
district's practice of allowing unrestricted student invocations at gradua-
tion ceremonies and football games in Doe v. Santa Fe Independent School
District.69 The school policy at issue did not provide that the student-given
invocations must be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing, as they were in
Jones II, and the court ruled that this absence made the policy unconstitu-
tional. 70 The court also found that the practice of delivering prayers at
football games was not synonymous with Jones I!-type solemnizing at gradu-
ation ceremonies and was unconstitutional in light of other Fifth Circuit
precedent.
7
'
In 1996, the Fifth Circuit examined a school prayer statute in Ingebret-
sen v. Jackson Public School District.72 The case involved a facial challenge to
a Mississippi statute strikingly similar to the Alabama statute in Chandler.73
"any prayers represent the will of their peers, who are less able to coerce participa-
tion than an authority figure from the state or clergy." Id.
67. See id. (noting age of students and Court's previous recognition that grad-
uating seniors "are less impressionable than younger students" (citing Board of
Educ. of the Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235-37 (1990) (approv-
ing Congress' extension of Court's reasoning in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
274 n.14 (1981), that age is inversely proportional to impressionability, from uni-
versity students to secondary school students))).
68. See id. at 972 (concluding that no elements of coercive effect test were
present in resolution allowing student-initiated prayer at high school graduation
ceremonies).
69. 168 F.3d 806, 806 (5th Cir. 1999) (addressing constitutionality of school's
permission of sectarian invocations at graduations and football games).
70. See id. at 814-16 (holding that failure to prohibit sectarian, proselytizing
prayer violates Establishment Clause). The court found the fact that the policy in
Jones II permitted only nonsectarian, nonproselytizing religious speech was one of
the reasons it was able to survive Establishment Clause scrutiny. See id. at 824
(holding words "nonsectarian" and "nonproselytizing" were necessary to make
school policy constitutional).
71. See id. at 822-23 (noting differences between prayer at graduation and
football games). In 1995, the court found the practice of Christian prayers at bas-
ketball and football games in violation of the Establishment Clause, and it distin-
guished the practice from that in Jones 1. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist.,
70 F.3d 402, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that Christian prayers violated Estab-
lishment Clause and not of same solemn nature as nonsectarian prayer at gradua-
tion). The court held, as it did in Duncanville, that the serious context and nature
of graduation was an essential element for upholding the Jones II policy, and there-
fore, prayer could not be permitted at football games. See Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 823
(stating that regardless of nonsectarian, nonproselytizing restrictions, prayer policy
cannot be extended to football games).
72. 88 F.3d 274, 277-81 (5th Cir. 1996) (hearing facial constitutionality chal-
lenge of Mississippi prayer statute).
73. See id. at 277 (examining language of statute being challenged). The lan-
guage being scrutinized states that "on public school property, other public prop-
erty or other property, invocations, benedictions or nonsectarian, nonproselytizing
[Vol. 45: p. 547
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The statute permitted student-initiated invocations or prayer at compul-
sory or noncompulsory school events, including graduation ceremonies.74
It was different from the Alabama statute because the invocations and
benedictions were unrestricted, and only the prayer was restricted to be
nonsectarian and nonproselytizing. 75 The court found that government
involvement in such religious practice was inevitable, and as stated by the
Supreme Court in the past, unconstitutional and inappropriate. 76 After
applying the three tests that the Supreme Court has used to determine if
governmental action has the effect of establishing religion, the court
struck down most of the statute.77 To be consistent with the decision in
Jones II, the only part of the statute saved was the permission of student-
initiated prayer at graduation ceremonies. 78 Had this case been brought
student-initiated voluntary prayer shall be permitted during compulsory or
noncompulsory school-related student assemblies, student sporting events, gradua-
tion or commencement ceremonies and other school-related student events."
1994 Miss. LAws 609, § 1(2).
74. See Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at 277 (paraphrasing language of Mississippi
statute).
75. See id. The Mississippi statute's language is very similar to the Alabama
statute, which permits student-initiated nonsectarian, nonproselytizing voluntary
prayer, invocations and/or benedictions. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.3(b) (1995).
76. See Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 902 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that be-
cause some activities are compulsory, voluntariness of participation cannot com-
pletely free students from governmental involvement in religious activity). It
should be noted that the Louisiana statute at issue in Karen B. specifically allowed
teachers to pick volunteers to pray, and if there were none, the teacher could
institute the prayer herself. See id. This is distinguishable from the Mississippi stat-
ute in Ingebretsen because it had no such provision. See Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at 277.
The court in Ingebretsen still found, however, that the statute would involve school
officials in determining which prayers were nonsectarian and nonproselytizing and
in determining who would say the prayer at the events. See id. at 278.
77. See Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at 279-80 (holding that Mississippi statute fails
Lemon test, coercive effect test and endorsement test). As stated previously, under
Lemon, a government practice is constitutional if it has a secular purpose, its pri-
mary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion and it does not excessively entan-
gle government with religion. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)
(setting forth test to determine Establishment Clause violation by state action).
Under the next test from Lee, the Court analyzed school-sponsored religious activ-
ity in terms of its coercive effect on students. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-
93 (1992) (focusing on possibility of indirect, public coercion through govern-
ment involvement in religious activity). Finally, the Court disapproved of govern-
mental practices that would appear to a reasonable person to endorse a particular
religion. See Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 755 (1995) (defin-
ing endorsement test as whether reasonable observer would believe state action
endorsed one particular religion); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594
(1989) (applying primary effect prong of Lemon test as separate endorsement test
to determine if state action endorsed religion). The Mississippi district court did
not make an extensive analysis under all three tests because it found that the stat-
ute was defective under any one of them and the Fifth Circuit agreed. See Ingebret-
sen, 88 F.3d at 279 (holding statute to have effect of establishing religion in
violation of First Amendment).
78. See Ingebretsen, 88 F.3d at 280 (holding that only part of statute that was
constitutionally acceptable was provision for prayer at graduation ceremonies).
13
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before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, allowance
of student-initiated invocations at high school graduation ceremonies
might have been struck down as well. 7
9
2. The Third Circuit's Approach
The Third Circuit decided an action to enjoin student-led prayer at
high school graduation in ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional
Board of Education.80 The school board responsible for the action initially
allowed clergy members to give an invocation at graduation, but in light of
Lee, reformed the policy to be consistent with the Fifth Circuit decision in
Jones I.81 The new policy allowed students to take a poll as to whether or
not there should be an invocation at graduation; if the majority voted in
favor of prayer, the students would determine what type of invocation and
what student volunteer would deliver it.8 2 The court determined that the
new policy did not have the effect of promoting free speech rights of stu-
dents because it was simply the majority imposing its religious views on the
minority. 83 The court also decided that the policy failed under Lee's coer-
The court relied on Fifth Circuit precedent from Jones II. SeeJones v. Clear Creek
Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that voluntary student
prayer at graduation ceremonies survives all Establishment Clause tests set forth by
Supreme Court).
79. See generally ACLU of NJ. v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d
1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding policy of allowing majority student vote to determine
whether there would be prayer at graduation unconstitutional).
80. 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996). The Third Circuit found that the "school
board's policy allowing vote of senior class to determine if prayer would be in-
cluded in high school graduation ceremonies could not be legitimized as promot-
ing free speech rights of students" and that "school board's policy violated
establishment clause." Id. at 1471.
81. See id. at 1474 (noting that school had long history of allowing prayer at
graduation given by clergy of various denominations). The school decided to re-
consider its policy pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Lee finding
school's inclusion of prayer at graduation unconstitutional. See id. After that, the
school proposed two alternatives, one permitting students to decide if there
should be graduation prayer and the nature of that prayer, consistent with Jones II.
See id. at 1475. The other alternative proposed a moment of reflection prior to
graduation. See id. (same). The school adopted the first approach, and instituted
it by conducting a poll asking students if they preferred prayer, a moment of si-
lence, or nothing at all prior to graduation. See id.
82. See id. at 1475 (noting school policy that students could decide how to
determine what form of prayer to have at graduation, if any at all). The determi-
nation of prayer form was left to the students "so long as the process [was] con-
ducted by duly elected class officers and the survey . . . provides pupils with an
opportunity to choose prayer, a moment of reflection, or nothing at all." Id. It
also required that the graduation programs include a disclaimer explaining that
any invocation given at commencement did not reflect the views of the school
board, the school district, administrators, staff or other students. See id. (noting
attempt to disassociate school officials from students' decisions).
83. See id. at 1477-78 (noting that it is not constitutional to protect religious
rights of majority only). The court noted that "the individual freedom of con-
science protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any reli-
gious faith or none at all." Id. at 1477 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53
560 [Vol. 45: p. 547
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cion test and the first two prongs of the Lemon test, and thus, it could not
survive Establishment Clause scrutiny.8 4 Although there is no decision on
this precise issue in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, there are indications that the court would likewise find prayer at
graduation ceremonies unconstitutional.
8 5
3. Precedent in the Ninth Circuit
Although recent challenges in the Ninth Circuit to prayer at public
high school graduations were dismissed for lack of standing, the court did
rule on the issue of voluntary prayer at school assemblies in Collins v. Chan-
dler Unified School District.8 6 This case dealt with a policy allowing the
school's student council to select a member of the student body to recite a
prayer before a school assembly during the school day.8 7 The court re-
jected the school's argument that the policy was merely an accommoda-
tion of religious freedom maintaining the neutrality toward religion
required by the Constitution.88 Although the student was free to choose
(1985)). The court emphasizes that the purpose of a Bill of Rights was to place
"certain subjects ... beyond the reach of majorities and officials." Id. at 1478.
"One's ... fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections." Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
84. See Black Horse, 84 F.3d at 1478-88 (holding that school policy failed under
both Lee coercion test and Lemon test). The court noted that although clergy were
not saying the prayers, the fact that the school still exercised so much control over
the graduation ceremony placed public pressure on the students. See id. at 1480
(applying and comparing pressure to conform aspect of coercion test of Lee). The
court concluded that the school's purpose in light of history was to advance reli-
gion, and that the action in effect did convey the message of favoring religion,
therefore, in failing the first two prongs of the Lemon test, the consideration of
excessive entanglement of religion was forgone. See id. at 1483-88.
85. See generally Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding no standing to challenge school policy for graduation prayer);
Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding prayer
during public high school graduation violated establishment clause), vacated sub
nom 515 U.S. 1154 (1995) (vacating for lack of standing after plaintiff graduated),
remanded, 62 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding challenge moot and vacating pre-
vious decision).
86. 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981).
87. See id. at 760-61 (discussing procedures of school policy to conduct prayer
at voluntary student assemblies). The court noted that the procedures were ac-
knowledged by the school principal, school district superintendent and the Board
of Education. See id. at 760 (noting approval of school prayer policy by school
officials).
88. See id. at 761 (rejecting school's argument that policy was not sponsorship
of religious activity by state). The school cited four Supreme Court cases in its
argument that held accommodation may be achieved by allowing student-initiated
prayer at voluntary activity, but the cases do not persuade the court. See id. at 761-
62 (noting school's argument); see also School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 203 (1963) (holding that daily Bible reading and class
recitation of prayer violated First Amendment notwithstanding that students could
be excused); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 421 (1962) (holding that daily denomi-
nationally neutral class recitation of prayer .violated First Amendment notwith-
standing provision to excuse children); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 306
NOTE
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the nature and wording of the prayer, and the other students were free to
decide between attending such assemblies or instead attending a study
hall, the court found the policy in violation of the Establishment Clause
under the Lemon test analysis. 89
C. History in the Eleventh Circuit
In 1989, an action challenging the recitation of invocations prior to
public high school football games was brought before the Eleventh Circuit
in Jager v. Douglas County School District.90 The school agreed not to moni-
tor the content of the religious speech and left it up to the students to
select volunteers to deliver the invocation. 91 Analysis under the Lemon test
led the court to conclude that the school district's action was in violation
of the Establishment Clause.9 2 It found that the school action had the
(1952) (releasing students to attend religious activities off school grounds held
constitutionally valid); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 203 (1948) (reli-
gious instruction conducted by clergy in classrooms during school hours violated
First Amendment notwithstanding ability to attend secular activities instead).
89. See Collins, 644 F.2d at 760-62 (holding that student choice of prayer and
voluntariness of activity policy still violated Establishment Clause). The court ac-
cepted the argument of Collins that the voluntariness of the activity and nonde-
nominational character of the prayer may not guarantee constitutionality under
the Establishment Clause. See id. at 761 (citing Engel, 370 U.S. at 430 (holding
voluntariness not dispositive of constitutionality)). Analyzing the policy under
Lemon, the court held that "the invocation of assemblies with prayer has no appar-
ent secular purpose and Chandler suggests none" and that the primary effect was
to advance religion because it appeared that the state could coerce students to
listen or forfeit the right to attend the assembly. Id. at 762.
90. 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989). The court noted that the games are con-
sidered school activities, take place on school property and are supervised by
school officials. See id. (noting school participation in activity at which invocation
is given). The invocations began in 1947, traditionally given by local ministers, and
between 1970 and 1986, on all but five occasions, had been given by Protestant
Christian clergymen. See id. at 826 n.2 (recognizing history of participation of cler-
gymen in leading invocations). A student at the school complained to the school
claiming that the invocations, which were like prayers, and often referred to Jesus
Christ, conflicted with his religious beliefs. See id. at 826 (noting student objection
to school's religious practice). The county school superintendent, school system
attorney, the objecting student's family and their attorney met to discuss alterna-
tive proposals for the invocations. See id. at 826-27.
91. See id. at 827 (specifying that student government would select speakers,
with no monitoring of content of speech by school).
92. See id. at 828-31 (finding that school plan does not comport with required
Establishment Clause neutrality toward religion). The school district argued that
the Lemon test did not apply, rather a different test should be used. See id. at 828
(arguing that Lemon test does not apply and standard from Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983), should be applied instead). The court found that the standard
from Marsh only applied to legislative prayer cases and applied Lemon to the case
before the court. See id. at 828-29 (stating that approach in Marsh was historical
approach to legislative prayer only). The court held that the historical approach
in Marsh is not applicable to determining the role of church and state in public
schools today, "since free public education was virtually nonexistent at the time the
Constitution was adopted." Id. at 829.
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purpose of perpetuating religion and the primary effect of advancing reli-
gion, although facially, it did not entangle state and religion.93 The Chief
Judge, however, dissented, recalling that the American people are a reli-
gious people, and some practices simply acknowledge and accommodate
the religions of individuals rather than have the effect of establishing any
particular religion.
94
In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit addressed a case on the recurrent issue
of school policy permitting student-initiated prayer at graduation ceremo-
nies in Adler v. Duval County School Board.95 The United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida held that the school policy of al-
lowing students to decide the type of speech to be given prior to gradua-
tion did not tend to establish religion under the Lemon test.96
Furthermore, the district court found that allowing students to compose
and deliver a graduation prayer without faculty review did not place coer-
cive pressure on the students to participate in religious activity.9 7 On ap-
peal, the Eleventh Circuit did not review the complex First Amendment
issue, finding the appellants' claims moot because they had graduated and
could no longer claim any current injury connected to the school policy.98
93. See id. at 828-31 (finding that school plan fails first two prongs of L.emon
test, though it does not facially entangle state with religion). The court found that
the school's purpose was not secular because the school rejected a proposal to
have wholly secular invocations. See id. at 829-30 (establishing school's actual pur-
pose to endorse religion). The primary effect of the school's rejection of secular
invocations and adoption of a religious invocations plan is to convey a message of
endorsement of religion. See id. at 831 (noting violation of primary effect prong of
Lemon test).
94. See id. at 835 (Roney, CJ., dissenting) (noting that Establishment Clause
cases present difficult task of attempting to prohibit government establishment of
religion while protecting American national identity as "a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being" (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
313 (1952))). The ChiefJudge noted the difficulty in Establishment Clause cases
and the many tests that the courts may use. See id. at 835-37. He concluded that
instead of the Lemon test, an analysis under Marsh would be appropriate. See id. at
837 (suggesting that Marsh standards should have been applied). The ChiefJudge
held that the Marsh approach, based on history and tradition, would reveal that all
practices religious in nature do not establish religion but rather tolerate "beliefs
widely held among the people of this country." Id. (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).
95. 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir. 1997).
96. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 451-55 (M.D. Fla.
1994) (finding school policy passed all three prongs of Lemon test), aff'd, 112 F.3d
1475 (1997).
97. See id. at 455-56 (finding school did not direct religious activity or coerce
objectors to participate). The court noted that the school district reformed its
policy to be within the boundaries set by the Supreme Court in Lee in 1992. See id.
at 448-49 (noting school's reform to satisfy Lee test). The court found the rational
of Jones H persuasive, in that there was less psychological pressure than in Lee be-
cause the invocations were selected by peers who have less coercive effect than the
state or an authority. See id. at 456 (agreeing with Fifth Circuit's analysis in Jones II
(referring to Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 971 (5th Cir.
1992))).
98. See Adler, 112 F.3d at 1479 (noting judicial principle that court should
exercise restraint and not reach constitutional issue if case should be dismissed on
2000] NOTE
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After students brought suit again, however, the Eleventh Circuit de-
cided on the constitutionality of the school district's present policy permit-
ting graduating students to vote to have unrestricted student-led messages
at graduation ceremonies. 99 Under the Lemon test and in light of Lee, the
court found the policy facially violative of the Establishment Clause.10 0
Although the control over religious activity by the school was less intrusive
than in Lee, it was present nonetheless, and school participation was deter-
minative of Establishment Clause violations. 0 1
In the early 1980s, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a case involving a
predecessor of the Alabama statute at issue in Chandler.'02 The Alabama
statute authorized teachers to observe a moment of silence for meditation
or voluntary prayer and also allowed teachers to lead students in a specific
prayer. 10 3 Following Supreme Court direction on such matters, the court
found that the statute allowed for unconstitutional state involvement with
religion and violated the Establishment Clause.' 0 4 Following a denial for
other grounds (citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,
445 (1988))).
99. See Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236, 1236 (11th Cir. 1999)
(holding that school's policy of permitting graduating students to vote on whether
to have unrestricted student-led messages at graduation ceremonies violated Estab-
lishment Clause).
100. See id. at 1243-51 (analyzing school policy under Lee and Lemon tests).
The court determined that although the entanglement between the school and
religion was less obvious or intrusive than in Lee, the school's control was not com-
pletely divested simply by delegating the power to choose to students. See id. at
1243-44 (noting extent of control activity maintained by state). The control still
exercised by the state constituted public pressure over the students, especially be-
cause they were either compelled to conform or miss their graduation. See id. at
1248. The court found, through the history of the policy, that it was enacted to
support prayer, and its primary effect was a permission of prayer, therefore, having
failed the first two prongs of Lemon, the court did not address the third prong. See
id. at 1249-51 (applying Lemon test).
101. See id. at 1243-48 (noting amount of control and coercive power state
had over students).
102. SeeJaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1983) (discussing
statute allowing for one minute of silence to be observed for meditation or volun-
tary prayer at beginning of school day); see also AL. CODE § 16-1-20.1 & 2 (Supp.
1982) (allowing moment of silence in school).
103. See Jafftee, 705 F.2d at 1528 (allowing moment of silence or teacher to
lead willing students in specific prayer referring to God); see also AtA. CODE § 16-1-
20.2 (allowing moment of silence in school).
104. See Jaffree, 705 F.2d at 1530-36 (noting that Supreme Court is ultimate
authority in interpreting Constitution and examining Supreme Court precedent to
conclude statute was unconstitutional (citing School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (holding school practice of beginning each day
with Bible reading was state activity violating Establishment Clause))); see also En-
gel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422-24 (1962) (holding that New York's program of
daily classroom invocation prescribed in prayer promulgated by its Board of Re-
gents was inconsistent with Establishment Clause of Constitution, though students
were not required to participate when parents objected); Everson v. Board of
Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1946) (holding state authorization
for reimbursement for bus fare to parents of school children, including parochial
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rehearing en banc, the Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the
Eleventh Circuit's holding that the statute was unconstitutional.' 0 5 After a
few attempts to make this same Alabama statute pass constitutional mus-
ter, the statute returned to the Eleventh Circuit Court once again in
Chandler.'0 6
III. THE FACTS OF CHANDLER V. JAM.&S
In 1993, the Alabama legislature enacted a statute permitting reli-
gious speech in its public schools. 10 7 The statute provided that genuinely
student-initiated, nonsectarian, nonproselytizing invocations, benedictions
or prayers would be allowed at public school-related, student events. 10 8
Suit was initiated in the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Alabama by a school vice-principle and his son ("Chandler") challeng-
ing the constitutionality of this latest in a series of Alabama "school prayer"
statutes. 1°9 The district court determined that the statute was unconstitu-
school children, was constitutional because Constitution requires state to be neu-
tral toward religion, not adversarial).
105. See Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 38 (1985) (affirming Eleventh Circuit
decision and holding Alabama moment of silence law unconstitutional). After re-
hearing en banc in front of the Eleventh Circuit was denied and appeals were
taken, the Supreme Court granted review and held that the Alabama statute, ALA.
CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1975), which authorized a daily moment of silence for medita-
tion or voluntary prayer in public schools was an endorsement of religion lacking a
secular purpose, and was a law tending to establish religion in violation of First
Amendment. See id. at 38-39 (holding Alabama statute in violation of Establish-
ment Clause).
106. See generally Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999) (dealing
with Alabama school prayer statute in its most recent form); Chandler v. James,
958 F. Supp. 1550, 1552 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (noting that in 1977, Alabama passed
first statute allowing moment of silence at beginning of school day). The 1977
statute was supplemented in 1981, declaring that the moment of silence be ob-
served for meditation or voluntary prayer. See Chandler, 958 F. Supp. at 1553 (dis-
cussing evolution of Alabama statute). In 1982, the third statute was passed
allowing teachers in public schools to lead willing students in a particular prayer.
See id. Both of these statutes were struck down by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals as violations of the Establishment Clause. See Jafftee, 705 F.2d at 1535-36
(holding Alabama statute allowing moment of silence unconstitutional); id. (hold-
ing Alabama statute allowing teacher to lead students in prayer unconstitutional).
107. See Chandler, 958 F. Supp. at 1553 (referring to section 16-1-20.3 of Ala-
bama Code).
108. See id. (setting forth relevant language in statute). The portion of the
statute at issue provides "[o] n public school, other public, or other property, non-
sectarian, non-proselytizing student-initiated voluntary prayer, invocations and/or
benedictions, shall be permitted during compulsory or non-compulsory school-re-
lated . . . events, school-related graduation . . . ceremonies, and other school-re-
lated activities." ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.3(b) (1995).
109. See Chandler, 958 F. Supp. at 1553 (documenting history of statute in Ala-
bama since 1977). A vice-principal in the DeKalb County school system, Michael
Chandler, and his son Jesse, a student in the system, brought the suit against the
Governor of Alabama, the State Superintendent of Education, the State Board of
Education members and the Talladega and DeKalb County Superintendents and
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tional and issued a permanent injunction. 110 The injunction prohibited
the defendants ("DeKalb") from participating in religious or devotional
activity with the students, or permitting it while in school or at school-
related events.' 1 An appeal to the Eleventh Circuit followed.'" 2
Although DeKalb did not appeal the holding that the statute was un-
constitutional, they did appeal the portion of the permanent injunction
that prohibited them from "permitting" student-initiated devotional
speech at school-related events. 113 DeKalb claimed that student-initiated
prayer is private religious speech, protected by the First Amendment Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses as completely as private secular
speech.' 14 Chandler contended that student-initiated religious speech is
boards of education members. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1256 (describing facts
under which initial suit was brought).
110. See Chandler, 958 F. Supp. at 1568 (ruling section 16-1-20.3 unconstitu-
tional for having effect of establishing religion and infringing on free speech and
religious rights). Ironically, the district court found that in specifying that nonsec-
tarian, nonproselytizing student religious speech be allowed, the statute infringed
on the free speech rights to sectarian, proselytizing speech. See id. at 1560-61
(holding statute infringed on students' free speech and prayer rights). The court
noted that the Establishment Clause operates to forbid government religious
speech, not private religious speech, which is only subject to reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions of any student speech while in school. See id. (holding
Establishment Clause does not apply to private speech in schools, which may only
be limited by reasonable time, place and manner).
In their stated purpose to protect students' free speech rights, religious
speech rights in particular, the court found that the state was defining students
free speech right too narrowly. See id. at 1561 (holding statute defined students'
free speech and religion rights too narrowly). After applying the Supreme Court
Establishment Clause tests, the court found that the statute's stated purpose could
not save it from being deemed unconstitutional because: (1) the statute's history
revealed that the real purpose was not secular; (2) the primary effect endorsed
religion and also coerced students to participate in religious acts; and (3) it cre-
ated entanglement between religion and state because of necessary, continuous
monitoring by school officials. See id. at 1562-67.
111. See generally Chandler v.James, 985 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (issu-
ing permanent injunction).
112. See generally Chandler, 180 F.3d 1254 (addressing appeal from United
States District Court for Middle District of Alabama).
113. See id. at 1257-58 (challenging only portion of permanent injunction that
enjoined school from permitting student-initiated invocations, benedictions or
prayers). The permanent injunction stated that DeKalb is enjoined from "aiding,
abetting, commanding, counseling, inducing, ordering, [permitting] or procuring
... school organized or officially sanctioned religious activity in its schools . . . at
school related events .... Id. DeKalb conceded that they could not constitution-
ally endorse religion. Id. at 1257 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992);
County ofAllegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989)).
114. See id. at 1257 (noting protections afforded religious speech by United
States Constitution (citing Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 760 (1995) (holding private religious speech is protected under Free Speech
Clause as secular speech)); Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (noting private speech endorsing religion is protected by
religion clauses of First Amendment); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582-85
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not purely private because it is in public schools and is state speech, thus
banned by the Establishment Clause.1 1
5
Upon reviewing the permanent injunction, the Eleventh Circuit
found that the district court could not constitutionally enjoin DeKalb from
permitting student-initiated religious speech in its schools or at school-
related student events.' 1 6
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Eleventh Circuit's Approach to School Prayer
1. State, Students and the Establishment Clause
The Chandler court pointed out that governmental bodies may not
establish any religion pursuant to the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.' 17 A private party's religious speech occurring publicly,
however, cannot establish religion. 118 DeKalb contended that the stu-
dents were private actors, incapable of establishing religion in violation of
the Establishment Clause. 119 Conversely, Chandler argued that student-
initiated prayer in public schools constituted state prayer that was forbid-
den by the Constitution.1 20 Accordingly, the court first analyzed the issue
of whether students who initiate prayer during school activities are state or
private actors. 12'
The court noted that, in some instances, private religious speech vio-
lates the Establishment Clause when directed by the state.122 For instance,
a school board may not write a prayer and require students to say it, nor
may a school delegate the task of initiating the prayer to another.1 23 Per-
(1987) (stating that private religious speech is protected and not establishment of
religion, unlike government religious speech))).
115. See id. at 1258 (contending that student prayer in public schools is state
prayer and not permitted under Establishment Clause).
116. See id. at 1258, 1265-66 (vacating permanent injunction and remanding
for further proceedings in light of decision that district court may not enjoin
school from permitting all student-initiated religious speech in schools).
117. SeeEverson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (recognizing that
reimbursements for public bus transportation to families attending parochial
schools did not have effect of establishing religion in violation of Establishment
Clause).
118. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (stating that private speech endorsing reli-
gion is protected by Free Speech and Exercise Clauses).
119. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1258 (noting arguments made by appellants).
120. See id. (noting appellee's claim that religious speech by students in pub-
lic school constitutes state speech).
121. See id. at 1258-60 (examining when student prayer is private and when it
is state prayer).
122. See id. at 1259 (noting possibility of state or school board trying to get
around prohibition against prescribing prayer by delegating power to others to
initiate prayer).
123. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding that state religious
practice of encouraging recitation of state written prayer in public school was in-
consistent with Establishment Clause); Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1259 (citing Lee v.
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mitting students to speak, but then restricting their speech to devotional
speech is also prohibited. 124 The requirement by the school that the
speech be religious is the violation, not that the speech is religious.
125
The Eleventh Circuit adopted this reasoning from the Supreme Court, as
illustrated in one of the original school prayer cases, Engel v. Vitale.126
The Court in Engel held that the government could not prescribe a
prayer, regardless of denominational neutrality, or carry on governmen-
tally sponsored religious activity. 127 Some lower courts interpreted this
holding to render all public expressions of religious belief in schools viola-
tive of the Establishment Clause.1 28 The Eleventh Circuit, however, found
the correct understanding to be that the Court forbade the religious ex-
pression because it was commanded by the state, not because it was reli-
gious in nature. 129 The Chandler court believed that the purpose of the
Supreme Court's ruling was not to be hostile towards religion, but to en-
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992) (invalidating school board policy permitting
clergy to give prayers at graduation)); Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897, 899 (5th
Cir. 1981) (invalidating school board guidelines that required student or teacher-
led prayers in classrooms).
124. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1259 (pointing out that if school gives students
permission to speak it may not restrict that speech to religious speech (citing In-
gebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1996); ACLU of N.J. v.
Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1474 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that
school board policy permitting students to vote to have prayer at graduation is
unconstitutional); Harris v.Joint Sch. Dist., 41 F.3d 447, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated
as moot, 515 U.S. 1155 (1995) (holding school policy permitting student to lead
prayer unconstitutional); Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 826 (11th
Cir. 1989) (stating that authorization of student-led invocations at school sporting
events is unconstitutional); Hall v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 656 F.2d 999, 1002-03 (5th
Cir. 1981) (holding religion course with primary effect of advancing Christianity
unconstitutional); Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 762-63 (9th
Cir. 1981) (holding rule authorizing invocations, benedictions, and prayers only
unconstitutional))).
125. See id. at 1259 ("It is not the 'permitting' of religious speech which
dooms these [State] policies, but rather the requirement that the speech be reli-
gious, i.e., invocations, benedictions, or prayers.").
126. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 430 (holding that "government in this country, be it
state or federal, is without power to prescribe by law any particular form of prayer
which is to be used as an official prayer in carrying on any program of governmen-
tally sponsored religious activity").
127. See id. (stating that even if prayer is denominationally neutral and stu-
dent observance is voluntary, action still violates Establishment Clause because
state commanded it).
128. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1259 (recognizing that lower courts have inter-
preted Engel to prohibit any religious speech in public schools). The Eleventh
Circuit noted that lower courts' support of such a contention rested in the
Supreme Court's finding that denominational neutrality of prayer did not "free it
from the limitations of the Establishment Clause." Id; see Engel, 370 U.S. at 430
(holding that prayer's neutrality did not render it valid under Establishment
Clause).
129. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1260 (interpreting Engel).
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sure that the government had no control over religion. 110 The court
found the reasoning in Engel entirely consistent with the traditionally un-
derstood purpose of the First Amendment religion clauses.1
3 1
The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation clearly shows that religious
speech is not forbidden in public schools.1 32 What is forbidden is school
involvement in student prayer, which must instead be genuinely student-
initiated.133 Chandler argued that by allowing this public, religious
speech, the school was endorsing religion and thus, at some level, was in-
volved in it.' 3 4 Chandler also argued that the schools must forbid all reli-
gious speech, student-initiated or not.'3 5 DeKalb countered by insisting
that students' religious speech should be afforded the same protections as
secular speech under the First Amendment.' 3 6 These arguments led to
the court's discussion of students' protection under the Free Exercise and
Free Speech Clauses. 13 7
2. Free Exercise and Free Speech by Students
a. Requirements for Neutrality toward Religion
The Chandler court noted that the Constitution requires a neutral ap-
proach to religion in schools.138 Chandler argued that the requirement of
neutrality could only be fulfilled by forbidding student prayer that was not
wholly private.' 3 9 DeKalb contended that the neutrality requirement
could only be fulfilled by allowing devotional speech the same freedoms
that secular speech enjoys.1 40 The court found Chandler's theory to im-
130. See id. (noting that Court's ruling was not intended to promote hostility
toward religion).
131. See id. (explaining purpose of Establishment Clause to keep government
from controlling religion aids in promoting Free Exercise). Support for this idea
can be found in Engel when the Supreme Court expounded on the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 435 (discussing Framers' intent
with respect to protection of religious rights). The purpose of the adoption of
parts of the Constitution and Bill of Rights was to forbid governmental control
over religion, thus ensuring religious freedom. See id. The First Amendment was
written to protect religion and prayer, not to destroy them. See id. (explaining
constitutional intent to protect religion from governmental interference or
imposition).
132. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1260 (stating that only school's commanding of
such prayer is prohibited).
133. See id. (noting that no prayer commanded by school or State can survive
under Establishment Clause scrutiny).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1261.
139. See id. at 1260 (arguing that state permission of prayer that is not purely
private prayer is endorsement). The Chandlers' argument seems to suggest that
any prayer by students expressed publicly in the school forum would be in viola-
tion of the Establishment Clause. See id.
140. See id. (referring to First Amendment protections of all speech).
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pose upon the school a duty to censor student speech if it was religious, a
theory the court readily rejected. 14 1
The court held that suppression of religious speech did not promote
neutrality but rather hindered neutrality. 142 Suppression would border
on hostility toward religion, an approach the Supreme Court has expressly
forbidden. 143 Such exclusion, in the Chandler court's view, was synony-
mous with unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 144 Logically, if gov-
ernmental endorsement of religion is prohibited because it favors
religion, the opposite action, disapproval of religion, would be just as im-
permissible. 145 The court found that the State has a constitutional duty to
tolerate religious expression.1 46 Toleration, not endorsement or discrimi-
nation, would achieve the required neutrality. 14 7
b. Accommodation of Religious Beliefs
The Chandler court noted that student-initiated religious speech could
be accommodated by the government without resulting in endorsement of
religion. 14 8 In fact, the court followed the Supreme Court theory that ac-
commodation is necessary to respect the religious nature of individuals. 149
141. See id. at 1261 (stating that Constitution does not allow suppression of
student-initiated prayer).
142. See id.; see also Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Pro-
grams: Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 189 (1992) (noting
that exclusion of what is religious in public sphere sends message of hostility not
neutrality).
143. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306(1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting that strict idea of neutrality may lead to
dedication towards what is secular, or active hostility towards religion, which is
prohibited by Constitution); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433-34 (1962) (holding
that Court's opinion should not be interpreted to suggest hostility toward prayer
or religion).
144. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831
(1995) (holding that suppression of religious speech is content-based censorship
and unconstitutional discrimination against certain viewpoints); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (stating that
government may not selectively censor religious content of free speech and any
control over content must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral, not
discriminatory).
145. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (recognizing that disapproval is just as unconstitutional as endorsement).
The Court urged that "[w]hat is crucial is that a government practice not have the
effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of
religion." Id. at 692.
146. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1261 (holding that permission of student reli-
gious expression is state's constitutional duty).
147. See id. at 1261-62 (noting state permission neither signifies approval nor
disapproval of religion, just true neutrality).
148. See id. at 1262 (holding that Constitution "affirmatively mandates accom-
modation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any"
(quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673)).
149. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672-78 (noting how governmental accommodation
action respects rather than endorses religion (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
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History reveals an acknowledgement by all three branches of the govern-
ment of the prevalent role of religion in the lives of Americans since the
late Eighteenth Century. 150 This was why the Chandler court found that
permitting religious speech and symbols in public schools did not auto-
matically constitute endorsement of religion, rather it accommodated and
showed respect for the religions of all people.' 5 '
The Chandler court considered that occassionally laws or governmen-
tal actions confer an indirect benefit upon religion, but are not for that
reason alone unconstitutional. 152  Therefore, permitting devotional
speech by students may incidentally advance religion without presump-
tively violating the Establishment Clause. 1 5 3 The court reached this con-
clusion because a student's religious speech is private speech endorsing
religion; therefore, it cannot establish religion and is protected by the First
Amendment. 154 After establishing that schools may not prescribe prayer
306, 314 (1952) (holding state action to adjust school schedule to accommodate
sectarian needs respected religious nature of people)); see also Vacca et al., supra
note 1, at 10 (noting constitutionality of government accommodation of peoples'
religious needs). This article discusses the neutrality requirement established by
Zorach. See id. at 10-12. The authors see neutrality as a broad and flexible concept
by which the Supreme Court illustrated a permissible role for government in ac-
commodating the religious needs of people, so long as government did not be-
come too involved or exercise control over the religious activity. See id. at 11. The
article makes the point that government may accommodate the public's religious
needs without violating the Constitution's Establishment Clause proscriptions. See
generally id.
150. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 677-78 (discussing history of religious awareness by
government). The Eleventh Circuit noted that symbols within our country such as
the national motto on currency, "In God We Trust," the Pledge of Allegiance lan-
guage "one nation under God" all attest to government's long-time awareness of
the significance of religion to Americans, yet have not been ruled unconstitutional
endorsements of religion by government. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1262 (holding
religious speech or symbols in public institutions are not automatically unconstitu-
tional endorsements of religion).
151. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1262 (noting permission of religious expression
can be constitutional accommodation rather than endorsement).
152. See id. at 1262-63 (relying upon Supreme Court language that "[n]ot
every law that confers an 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon [reli-
gion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid" (quoting Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973))); see also Lynch, 465
U.S. at 683 (noting governmental action may occasionally cause some advance-
ment of religion). The Lynch Court noted that any benefit to religion by the city,
including religious symbols in a holiday display, was indirect and incidental to the
state action and did not establish violation of First Amendment. See id. (holding
recognition by city of holidays and religious symbols was not violation of Establish-
ment Clause).
153. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1262-63 (noting speech does not necessarily vio-
late Establishment Clause merely because it advances religion).
154. See id. at 1263 (holding that private speech endorsing religion does not
violate Establishment Clause). The Eleventh Circuit found support for this theory
in the Supreme Court and in Fifth Circuit precedent in Jones II. See id. (citing to
Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that
student religious speech is private speech fully protected by Free Exercise and Free
Speech Clauses)).
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to students nor censor or prohibit religious speech, the court turned to
what it deemed to be the ultimate issue. 15 5
c. Valid School Limits on Religious Speech
After the court resolved the disputes involving the injunction, it
turned to what it considered to be the real issue of the case: when, where
and under what circumstances may students initiate religious speech in
public schools.156 To fulfill the court's constitutional duty to permit free
exercise while prohibiting state involvement, the court found itself re-
quired to resolve the tension between the First Amendment religion
clauses. 157 The court posed the question of how a school could accommo-
date religious expression without commanding it.' 58
DeKalb argued that this was not a complex issue, proposing that the
school must simply permit student prayer. 1 59 DeKalb contended that stu-
dents who wish to exercise their First Amendment right to speak relig-
iously at school-related events must be permitted to do so. 1 6 0 Although
the court agreed with DeKalb, it recognized that simply permitting reli-
gious speech is not always a simple solution. 16 1
In cases where students were permitted to pray, but the school partici-
pated in the student-initiated prayer in some way, it was considered uncon-
stitutional state action. 162 An example of such state action would be
155. See id. (holding that school may not prescribe prayer or prohibit reli-
gious speech).
156. See id. (addressing what court deems to be real issue). The court noted
that the real issue was what time, place and manner restrictions could be applied
to genuinely student-initiated religious speech. See id.
157. See id. at 1263-64 (noting difficult task of court to alleviate tension be-
tween free exercise and establishment of religion).
158. See id. at 1264.
159. See id. (arguing that religious speech must simply be permitted, not com-
manded or required).
160. See id. (contending that private parties, including students, may exercise
First Amendment rights while in school or at school-related events).
161. See id. (holding that genuinely student-initiated speech is individual's de-
cision, protected by First Amendment, and must be permitted); see also Board of
Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (holding
that private speech endorsing religion is protected by Free Speech and Free Exer-
cise Clauses); Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 965 (5th Cir.
1992) (noting that student's decision to speak religiously is not at state's command
and fully protected).
162. See Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 406-407 (5th Cir.
1995) (holding that coaches' and other school employees' participation in student
prayer is unconstitutional state endorsement of religion); Bishop v. Aronov, 926
F.2d 1066, 1073 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating teacher's religious speech is representa-
tive of school action and unconstitutional endorsement of religion);Jager v. Doug-
las County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 826 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding pre-game
invocations given by clergymen at public school football game over which school
exercises supervision unconstitutional); Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644
F.2d 759, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding school policy on student prayer at school
supervised and planned assemblies unconstitutional).
[Vol. 45: p. 547
26
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss3/5
teachers joining in with the student religious speech, possibly misrepre-
senting a school's endorsement. 163 The Chandler court held, in light of
Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, that there must be abso-
lutely no oversight or "active" supervision on the part of the school for the
student prayer to be constitutional. 164 The only allowance of supervision
is that the religious speech be subject to the same reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions imposed on all other student speech in school.16
5
The court decided that students' speech, although it could be limited
to some extent, could not be censored or regulated unreasonably in the
nonpublic forum of the school. 166 The school must be neutral with re-
spect to the content of the speech. 1 67 Only those restrictions applied to
student secular speech may be applied to religious speech as well. 168 The
court warned that students may not attempt to use the machinery of the
state to preach or convert their audience, because proselytizing is inher-
ently coercive and prohibited by the Constitution.
169
163. See Duncanville, 70 F.3d at 406-07 (holding school employees' participa-
tion in student prayer is unconstitutional state endorsement of religion); Bishop,
926 F.2d at 1073 (stating that teacher's religious speech is representative of school
action and unconstitutional endorsement of religion).
164. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1265 n.19 (holding student religious speech
must be without supervision or oversight by school (citing Duncanville, 70 F.3d at
410 (establishing that active supervision of student prayer must be avoided))). In
Duncanville, the Eleventh Circuit limited the forbidden school supervision to "ac-
tive" supervision, such as promoting, encouraging or leading prayers. See Dun-
canville, 70 F.3d at 410. The court, basing its decision on Supreme Court
precedent, concluded that supervision did not mean mere presence. See Mergens,
496 U.S. at 236-37 (allowing school officials to exercise custodial authority over
religious student meetings on school property).
165. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1264-65 (stating that reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions applied to secular speech in school may be applied to religious
speech).
166. See id. at 1265 (recognizing that student speech is protected speech
therefore content cannot be censored by government). The court recognized that
content-based censorship of religious speech would constitute viewpoint discrimi-
nation, which would clearly be unconstitutional. See id. (referring to Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (holding government
censorship of speech content was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination)).
167. See id. (noting that school may restrict access to forum only if decision is
viewpoint-neutral (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (holding control over speech in nonpublic forum can be
based on subject matter only if reasonable in light of purpose of forum and view-
point neutral))).
168. See id. (ruling that religious speech could only be subject to same reason-
able restrictions as secular speech in school).
169. See id. (cautioning that Constitution permits freedom of religious expres-
sion, not religious proselytizing). The court noticed the Supreme Court has
warned that student's right to speak of her personal beliefs does not give her the
right to impose her beliefs on others, particularly through the use of the school's
instruments. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226
(1963) (stating students may not use machinery of state to convert audience). Fur-
thermore, the Court has stated that proselytizing religious speech is coercive, and
the use of government property as a means to proselytize is state action violating
2000] NOTE
27
Rafalowski: Can Public Schools Really Permit Religious Speech without Promoti
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2000
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Ultimately, the court found in favor of DeKalb's argument that the
school cannot be constitutionally enjoined from permitting student-initi-
ated religious speech. 170 The school was still constitutionally enjoined,
however, from participating in or actively supervising any such speech be-
cause that would be inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
171
B. Critical Analysis of Eleventh Circuit's Reasoning
1. Reasoning in Light of Precedent
Federal circuit courts are ultimately bound by precedent set by the
United States Supreme Court.1 72 Because the Eleventh Circuit has never
previously addressed an issue directly on point with Chandler, it looked to
Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence for guidance. 173
a. Accommodation as Part of Toleration
One of the main theories that the Eleventh Circuit relied on was that
the State must not only tolerate religion, but also accommodate it.174 The
Supreme Court stated this very principle many times, acknowledging that
the Constitution does not require an absolute separation between Church
and State. 175 It follows from the well-established reasoning that part of
the Establishment Clause. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (re-
minding courts that accommodation of religion is limited by action tending to
establish religion).
170. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1265-66 (holding part of Permanent Injunction
unconstitutional and stating that school must permit student-initiated religious
speech, subject only to same time, place and manner restrictions as secular
speech).
171. See id. at 1265 (noting school personnel may not participate in or actively
supervise student-initiated religious speech).
172. See, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, The Emasculated Role ofJudicial Precedent in the
Tax Court and Internal Revenue Service, 39 OKi-A. L. REv. 427, 445 (1986) (noting that
lower federal courts are bound by precedent established by courts that may review
their decisions); Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the
Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1143, 1210 (1999) (noting Supreme Court instruction on hierarchy of federal
court system requires lower federal courts to follow precedent of Supreme Court
established by decisions directly on point (citing Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S 370, 375
(1982) (berating Fourth Circuit for declining to follow Supreme Court
precedent))).
173. For a discussion of the Supreme Court precedent that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit examined, see infra notes 172-188 and accompanying text.
174. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1262-63 (noting that Constitution "mandates
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward
any" (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984))). The Court has spoken
on accommodation, finding it permissible under the Establishment Clause, espe-
cially for the purpose of lifting the "burden on the free exercise of religion." Lee,
505 U.S. at 629 (Souter, J., concurring).
175. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1262 (stating that complete separation of
church and state prohibiting toleration of religion is not required by Constitu-
tion). The court addressed the "wall" concept, noting that the Supreme Court has
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constitutionally mandated toleration is accommodation.' 76 The Supreme
Court, in interpreting the Establishment Clause, has stated that it was
never intended to foster "callous indifference" toward religion.17 7 Accord-
ingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that a lack of accommodation would
represent hostility, which would clearly be constitutionally forbidden.' 7 8
b. Support in Light of Personal Liberty
Aside from looking to Supreme Court precedent, the Chandler court
gleaned the validity of the accommodation theory from the fact that ac-
commodation of and respect for others' religious beliefs is a task every
American freely takes on every day. 1 79 Endorsement does not necessarily
follow from respect for others' values and traditions.1 80 The court stated
that the government could show the same respect through accommoda-
tion without endorsing religion.18 ' The government's respect for the reli-
gions of its people helps to foster the same type of toleration and respect
among those people.1 8 2 Accordingly, the court concluded that state toler-
referred to it as "merely a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier." Id. at n.12
(citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
176. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (holding Constitution mandates accommoda-
tion of all religions and forbids hostility toward any religion); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (holding that government action accommodating reli-
gion respects religious nature of American people).
177. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (1984) (holding that "[a]nything less [than
accommodation] would require the 'callous indifference' we have said was never
intended by the Establishment Clause," and "would bring us into 'war with our
national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment's guaranty of free exercise
of religion"' (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314 & McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 211-12 (1948))).
178. See id. (holding Constitution forbids hostility toward any religion).
179. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1263 (noting everyday life in America involves
acceptance of religious beliefs not shared with others (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 628 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (recognizing need to accommodate
religion))). The court recognized that part of the price Americans freely pay for
their individual liberty is respect for the rights of others to voice their beliefs. See
id.
180. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., concurring) (recognizing that in
showing respect through accommodation people can "express respect for, but not
endorsement of, the fundamental values of others" and in doing so, they can "act
without expressing a position on the theological merit of those values or of reli-
gious belief in general" and not be perceived as having taken such position).
181. See id. (stating that government may accommodate religious beliefs as
Americans do everyday without having effect of endorsing any particular religious
view).
182. See id. at 637-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stressing importance of govern-
ment and public school cultivation of respect for religious observances of others).
Justice Scalia argues that even if the act of displaying respect for the religious views
of the people were mistaken for government participation, the interest in main-
taining respect for religion would generally override the false appearance and any
challenger's interests. See id. (noting that rather than inferring endorsement from
accommodation, inferring respect is reasonable, permissible inference).
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ation was not coercive, so long as the state remained neutral and did not
favor any particular religion in any way. 183
c. Suppression as a Form of Hostility
Another theory that the court adopted in Chandlerwas that forbidding
student-initiated religious speech would be equivalent to suppression,
which could be interpreted as hostility toward religion, an act explicitly
forbidden by the Supreme Court.184 Singling out religious speech and
prohibiting it signifies government disapproval of religion. 185 The court
reasoned that such government disapproval of religion, in addition to gov-
ernment endorsement of religion, violates the Establishment Clause be-
cause such disapproval crosses over from the required position of
neutrality to one of hostility. 186 Accommodation of religion is not neces-
sarily an endorsement, and it is necessary to prevent hostility, while dis-
criminatory suppression frustrates that goal.' 8 7 The court found that
suppression was not constitutional because it would endorse nonreligion
and promote hostility. 188
2. Consistency Within the Opinion
Throughout the opinion, the court recognized the difficulty of deter-
mining when genuinely student-initiated religious speech may be permit-
183. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1263 (recognizing established rule from Lee that
state commanding speech has coercive potential).
184. See id. at 1261-62 (holding that act of isolating and suppressing student-
initiated religious speech discriminates, going against requirement of neutrality
and demonstrating hostility); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984)
(holding Constitution forbids hostility toward any religion).
185. See McConnell, supra note 142, at 189 (stating that exclusion of religion
sends message of hostility). The court seemed to quote this article to make the
point that to allow nonreligious views and speeches in public schools but exclude
religious ones is discriminatory, hostile and ultimately an unconstitutional disap-
proval of religion. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1261 (citing McConnell and stating
that prohibition of religious and not nonreligious speech constitutes forbidden
state disapproval of religion).
186. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1261 (holding endorsement and disapproval of
religion are both unconstitutional). "If endorsement is unconstitutional because it
'sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,' disapproval is unconsti-
tutional because it 'sends the opposite message.'" Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at
688).
187. See id. (stating that "discriminatory suppression of student-initiated reli-
gious speech demonstrates not neutrality but hostility toward religion").
188. See id. (recognizing that banning all religious expression from schools
establishes nonreligion). The court is suggesting that while the Establishment
Clause forbids the government from establishing religion, it equally forbids the
establishment of nonreligion. See id. (holding that in suppression of religion, state
establishes disbelief as its religion). Because the Constitution requires neutrality,
the government cannot prefer disbelief and nonreligion over religion. See id. (not-
ing government must be neutral toward both).
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ted and when it may be limited. 189 The tension between the right to pray
and the right to be free from governmentally mandated prayer was recog-
nized and addressed by the court.19 0 Unfortunately, although the Elev-
enth Circuit attempted to give guidance to the district court on the issue,
the court itself had little clear guidance to follow.191 After the court estab-
lished that genuinely student-initiated speech must be permitted, it left
only the ultimate question of when, where and how it may be permit-
ted.'9 2 On this issue, the court added little to the established principle
that the state may in no way be involved in religious speech, it must simply
permit it, subject only to the same restrictions as secular speech. 19 3
The only type of apparent inconsistency was that although the district
court found the statute facially unconstitutional, the Eleventh Circuit
claimed not to examine that holding because it was not appealed.1 94 The
court found, however, that the content of the statute on its face was exactly
what the district court could not enjoin DeKalb from doirig.195 The stat-
ute permitted genuinely student-initiated prayer at school events, and the
court held that the school could not be enjoined from permitting just
that.19 6 The Eleventh Circuit did not distinguish its holding from what
189. See generally id. (holding student-initiated religious speech in public
schools constitutional but recognizing difficulty in applying same reasonable re-
strictions to it that apply to other student speech).
190. See id. at 1263-65 (recognizing that court has duty to aid in determining
how school may accommodate religion without commanding it).
191. See Russo, supra note 2, at 3 n.9 (suggesting that lack of definitive inter-
pretation of First Amendment by Supreme Court leads to conflicting lower federal
court outcomes).
192. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1263 (questioning what reasonable time, place
and manner restrictions may be placed on genuinely student-initiated religious
speech).
193. See id. at 1264-65 (mandating that genuinely student-initiated speech
must always be permitted subject only to same restrictions as secular speech). In
attempting to answer the question of how a school may accommodate religious
expression without directing it, the court just reiterated the principles stated ear-
lier in its holding. See id. (restating that state may permit but not direct or censor
religious speech). The court discussed precedent that stated that reasonable re-
strictions on religious speech were allowed, but did not define any such reasonable
restrictions. See id. at 1265 (citing to Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &Educ. Fund,
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (authorizing reasonable and viewpoint neutral re-
strictions); Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Peny Local Educators'Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)
(same)).
194. See id. at 1256-58 (noting district court held statute facially unconstitu-
tional but that district court may not constitutionally enjoin schools from permit-
ting student-initiated religious speech).
195. See id.
196. See id. at 1256 (holding schools may not be enjoined from permitting
genuinely student-initiated religious speech). The statute that was struck down
provided that its purpose was to protect freedom of speech and to accommodate
free exercise of religious rights of citizens in public schools. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-
20.3(a) (1995) (stating legislative intent and purpose). In protecting such rights,
the statute stated that "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing student-initiated voluntary
prayer, invocations and/or benedictions shall be permitted" at all various school-
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the statute permitted, it merely provided some guidance regarding appro-
priate restrictions on religious speech in public schools. 19 7
V. IMPACT/ CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that schools may not be enjoined
from permitting religious speech leans toward accommodation of free ex-
ercise and protection of free speech. 198 Although the Eleventh Circuit
had never addressed this precise issue in the past, and the Supreme Court
precedent lacks specific guidance, the Chandler court seemed to stress that
freedom of speech and religion can coexist with freedom from establish-
ment. 199 The court explained that so long as the government did not
entangle itself with student religious activity or coerce it in any way, such
religious activity in public schools would be constitutional. 200 The court
seemed to believe that religious speech could, in fact, be considered genu-
inely student-initiated within the government's public school setting, given
the appropriate circumstances. 20 1 Constant repetition of the word "genu-
inely" preceding student-initiated prayer emphasizes the court's belief that
such speech can exist, but must be truly free from school control.20 2 Un-
fortunately, this latest Eleventh Circuit decision provides little further gui-
dance for states to answer the question of how exactly to permit and
protect students' right to free religious speech while in public school, with-
out participating or supervising in any way.20 3
Further confusion stems from the fact that the court held that the
school must permit student-initiated religious speech, the same speech the
statute facially purported to permit, subject only to those limits imposed
on secular speech. 20 4 This could possibly influence yet another revision of
related events on school property. See AI. CODE § 16-1-20.3(b) (1995) (setting
forth statutory commands).
197. See Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1264-65 (stating that government may not cen-
sor speech based on content, but may restrict type of speech under reasonable
circumstances).
198. See id. at 1265-66 (holding permanent injunction may neither prohibit
genuinely student-initiated religious speech nor impose restrictions on it above
those restrictions on secular speech in schools).
199. See id. at 1264 (recognizing duty of court to resolve tension between stu-
dents' right to pray and their right to be free from governmentally-established reli-
gion and prayer).
200. See id. (recognizing that genuinely student-initiated speech only consti-
tutes state action if state actively supervises or participates in religious exercise).
201. See id. at 1265 (holding that proper circumstances for religious speech
should be same as those for secular, and both subject to same restrictions).
202. See id. at 1265-66 (holding that genuinely student-initiated student prayer
must be permitted and that genuinely student-initiated student prayer cannot be
enjoined by court).
203. See id. at 1264-65 (holding only that student religious speech must be
permitted so long as state is not participating or actively supervising).
204. See id. at 1256 (holding that schools may not be enjoined from permit-
ting genuinely student-initiated religious speech). Pursuant to the statute's stated
purpose to protect students' free speech and free expression rights, the statute
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the Alabama statute in one more attempt to survive constitutional scrutiny,
perhaps by specifying such reasonable limits. 20 5 Other states may follow,
but all still face the uncertainty of whether their circuit will approve of the
statute while waiting for the Supreme Court to address more specifically
when allowance of student-initiated prayer in public schools will pass Es-
tablishment Clause tests.20 6 The Eleventh Circuit's holding may symbolize
the beginning of a swing, at least within that circuit, toward accommoda-
tion and protection of free religious speech and away from anti-establish-
ment by suppression of student religious expression in schools.
20 7
Lynne A. Rafalowski
provided that "nonsectarian, nonproselytizing student-initiated voluntary prayer,
invocations and/or benedictions shall be permitted" at all various school-related
events on school property. See ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.3(b) (1995) (setting forth stat-
utory commands).
205. See Chandler v.James, 958 F. Supp. 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting
series of revisions and enactment of fourth Alabama statute in 1993 with intention
to make state prayer statute constitutional).
206. See Kristine Kuenzli, Opportunity Wasted: The Supreme Court's Failure to
Clarify Religious Liberty Issues in Rosenburger v. Rector and Visitors of the University
of Virginia, 32 GONZ. L. REv. 85, 88 (1996-97) (noting present Supreme Court
Establishment Clause is in disarray and provides no guidance for religious liberty
cases); Vacca et al., supra note 1, at 22-23 (noting that the Supreme Court "has
created an almost insurmountable judicial dilemma for the courts below"). This
article concludes that it remains difficult to predict how future courts being faced
with growing numbers of public school religion issues, especially those involving
student speech and expression, will attempt to balance the Establishment Clause
with the Free Exercise Clause to maintain accommodation without establishment.
See id. (recognizing uncertainty of outcomes in future cases involving accommoda-
tion and antiestablishment of religion in public schools).
207. Compare Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1258-66 (focusing on accommodation of
students religious speech), with Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236,
1246-47, 1251 (11th Cir. 1999) (focusing on possible school involvement and de-
claring student-led prayer at graduation unconstitutional), andJaffree v. Wallace,
705 F.2d 1526, 1530-36 (11 th Cir. 1983) (concluding statute permitting moment of
silence unconstitutional).
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